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Abstract—The need for sensors to deliver, communicate, col-
lect, alert, and share information in various applications has
made wireless sensor networks very popular. However, due to
its limited resources in terms of computation power, battery
life and memory storage of the sensor nodes, it is challenging
to add security features to provide the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. In order to communicate reliably with trust and
authenticity, providing data and system security especially for
those sensors dealing with sensitive data related to healthcare,
military activity, environmental sensing for weather prediction or
seismic data etc. is vital. Blockchain technology ensures security
and avoids the need of any trusted third party for security.
However, applying Blockchain in a resource-constrained wireless
sensor network is a challenging task because Blockchain is
power, computation, and memory hungry in nature and demands
heavy bandwidth due to control overheads. In this paper, a new
routing and a private communication Blockchain framework
is designed and tested with sensors generating constant and
continuous data (like voice and video). However, it is realized
that even if computation and bandwidth requirements are taken
for granted, storage and battery life will cripple the sustainability
of Blockchain application in sensor networks especially for high
data generating sensors. The proposed Load Balancing Multi-
Hop (LBMH) routing shares and enhances the battery life of
the Cluster Heads and reduce control overhead during Block
updates, but due to limited storage and energy of the sensor
nodes, Blockchain in sensor networks may never be a reality
unless storage and battery life of sensor devices are not limited on
the one hand and computation power and bandwidth availability
are high, on the other.
Index Terms—Sensor Networks, Blockchain Technology, Clus-
ter Head
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks have a wide range of applica-
tions including industrial, healthcare, military, environmental
sensing and monitoring, urbanization and infrastructure [1]. In
most of these applications, they deal with sensitive informa-
tion, so security should be required, to provide privacy, data
integrity and availability [2] [3]. The network comprises of a
group of lightweight battery powered devices and a wireless
infrastructure to record and monitors the surrounding envi-
ronment (building, city, wild areas and so on). The inherent
problem of the network includes limited shared bandwidth,
low computation power, low storage, and limited battery life.
When nodes are deployed in inaccessible terrains or disaster
relief areas localization of the sensor nodes is a huge challenge
[4]. Due to its limited resources, providing computationally
intensive security features is a huge challenge. However, pro-
viding security to the node and ensuring data communication
secrecy is vital to maintaining the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA) so required. In such networks, security
vulnerabilities of different layers of the network from physical
to the application layer are highlighted by [5] [6]. One such
technology that ensures implementation of the CIA triad as
a package in security is Blockchain technology. Blockchain
provides a global digital ledger to be used for every form
of transaction and record in a systematic order. It is public,
but it’s tamper-proof, node failure tolerant, and secure without
the need or help of any trusted third party. This makes it
an interesting technique to apply in any kind of distributed
network and is used for cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Etherium,
Ripple etc) [7] with great success, but grows as a threat to the
traditional financial banking system. In this paper a wireless
sensor network framework is designed aiming to support a
Blockchain by considering the limited computational power,
battery life and storage of the sensor nodes in one hand and
conducts architecture optimization to reduce control overhead
needed for routing and block updates and balances energy
among cluster heads.
II. BACKGROUND STUDY
The Blockchain, is built by providing asymmetric key en-
cryption, hash values, Merkle Trees and Peer-to-Peer networks
and its application domain is vast as highlighted in [8]. In a
sensor network with limited resources, it will be more appro-
priate to design a lightweight key encryption technique rather
than using standard asymmetric key encryption techniques.
The technology is also used in designing robotic swamp
systems to provide security, decision making, behavioral dif-
ferentiation and business models [9]. In a Bitcoin Blockchain,
a block takes around 10 minutes to complete its processing,
so to confirm a transaction it takes a long time. So, directly
applying the Blockchain technology in a sensor network is not
feasible due to a limited resource build-in the sensor nodes,
latency effect and the network limitations nature like through-
put and bandwidth, when dealing with real-time sensitive and
urgent sensor information. Sensor nodes can be responsible
for collecting different types of data including video, images,
voice, movement, temperature, seismic data for example. If
the data collection is video or images which need considerable
processing and transmission time, adding a distributed global
ledger will totally outweigh the feasibility and advantages of
security and indestructible scope provided by Blockchain due
to limited sensor resources in terms of computation power,
storage, and battery life. Since data communication of image
sensor networks takes most of the energy, data compression
technique allow a significant reduction in the transmission
time and correspondingly the overall transmission energy
[10]. Balancing an energy consumption of communication
and computation could be achieved by data compression and
its true when data to be communicated is image or video,
but in many cases data communication may take the least
energy consumption compared to computation, if data to be
communicated is small in size eg. temperature data, seismic
data, humidity data and so on. In fact, enabling security
features and incorporating salient features of security in terms
of providing data integrity, confidentiality, and availability, the
energy usage for computation will overwhelm that is used for
data communication, especially when the data is neither image
nor video like data.
A. Security Challenges and Related Work in Sensor Network
As briefed in the introduction in order to consider that a
system is secured, the following three points are vital and
mandatory:
1) Confidentiality: Unauthorized users should not be al-
lowed or should not be able to access any sensitive
information from a system.
2) Integrity: The guarantee that information is not tam-
pered with or altered, modified or deleted by an unau-
thorized user.
3) Availability: Authorized user should be able to access
the data when needed or required. The means of making
the data available can be through a physical presence
in front of the system or via a network.
In the current sensor model, the Sink collects all the data,
so the confidentiality, integrity, and availability are maintained
and controlled via the Sink. Authentication of the sensor nodes
after deployment and data privacy are incorporated in order to
avoid access of the data by unauthorized users. The key for
maintaining the confidentiality of sensed data is managing the
private key or shared key in such a way that others don’t have
a way to access the private key or the shared key because
compromising the private key or shared key will lead to
leaking of information. One of the latest key management
systems designed is CONIKS [11], it does not need users
from encryption key management. In this mechanism, initially
the user request for a public key from the server by using
a user-name and here, when it wants to communicate with
another user then it checks if the public key it uses is the
same as the public key held by the receiver. It also ensures
that the key has not been changed. In a sensor network,
communication from the Sink to the data server or cloud
server could also use certificates to guarantee security over
the data transmission over the internet, but it has to make
sure that the certificate providers should be a trusted third
party. In order to maintain the trust of the certificate provider
and conduct Secure Socket Layer (SSL) auditing in real time
(validity of the certificate can be checked), a Google Certificate
Transparency framework is developed using a Merkle hash
tree [12]. In a Blockchain model, the integrity of the data
is maintained by using hashing techniques and proof-of-work
method. In terms of data availability, since the data storage in
Blockchain is distributed in nature, access to data is easy and
readily available. The interesting fact, about Blockchain, is that
since it works on distributed nature, attack on some portion of
the network will not impact the entire network. However, the
majority attack or 51% attack is a situation, where a single
user or n number of users take control of the majority of the
mining power, so the attacker takes control in generating a
new block, receiving rewards, reverse transactions etc.
A zero-knowledge proof or zero-knowledge protocol is a
method in which a user claims to know certain information
without revealing more than the claim made about knowing
the information [13]. The privacy of the data can be increased
through this method as designed in Zerocoin [14], Zerocash
[15] or Zcash [16], unlike bitcoin where the data and the
distributed ledger is not private [17]. If original Blockchain
technology idea is closely observed, it is clear that all the
data is available to all the participating users or devices, so
confidentiality is not a primary feature of this technology,
however, anonymity of the user identification is maintained.
It’s computation expensive and complex, so adopting such
method in Sensor networks will be very challenging.
Due to the nature of the limited resource constraints of
the sensor networks, incorporating security features to provide
data confidentiality, data availability, data integrity, authenti-
cation, avoiding relay attack, access control, denial of service
attack and non-repudiation attack is a huge challenge [18] [19].
If a Blockchain can be applied, then there is no need of a
trusted third party and the aspects of privacy, integrity, and
confidentiality will be covered and provides high-level security
and avoid replay attack and non-repudiation all at the same
time. Other security aspects like detecting malicious nodes,
intrusion detection, and access control can also be ensured
to provide better overall security to the sensor networks. The
security levels can be grouped into three categories i.e. Data
level requirement (anonymity and freshness), access level re-
quirement (authentication, authorization, and accessibility) and
network level requirements (robustness, self-organization, time
synchronization) as highlighted in [20]. The authors of [20]
also elaborate that attacks in a wireless sensor network can
happen across the layers starting from the physical layer to the
application layer. Attacking the physical layer can give access
to unauthorized nodes, whilst jamming and data collision tech-
niques can destroy the usable channel and caused congestion,
data loss, increased interference and waste energy at the Data
link layer. The attack can also occur in a Network layer in the
form of replay attack, sink-hole, selective route forwarding,
hello flooding and spoofing in order to generate an error or
false message, misleading route compromise, refusing data
forward, network congestion and data tampering respectively.
Other forms of attacks can include energy draining by sending
un-ending connection request at the transport layer to exhaust
the node’s resources and it can even lead to denial of service.
A node can be inserted along the path of communication to
generate false data to attack the ongoing communication and
degrades the energy usage and increase the data collision at
the application level. Other authors also highlight the security
challenges in the Internet of Things (IoT) and identify the
security vulnerabilities and threads in [21] [22] [23]. This
paper aimed to design a Blockchain framework to address
security solutions as a single package since Blockchain doesn’t
need a trusted third party to perform secure communication
between any two transacting nodes but ensures data confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability. In a decentralize sensor
network, in order to build trust and authenticate, a Blockchain
based mechanism is designed in [24], but this paper is a first
attempt in wireless sensor networks to study the applicability
of Blockchain in terms of resource constraints.
B. Blockchain applicability in Sensor Networks
Blockchain technology is an amazing concept, but will it be
applicable in sensor network where the computation, battery
life, storage, and bandwidth are limited. Moreover, adopting
Blockchain technology in a distributed network has lots of
advantages including data incorruptible, data temper-proof,
non-repudiation, resilient to failure, provides transparency
with pseudonymity, validity checking, avoidance of depending
on specific systems to mention some. However, adopting
Blockchain has many challenges including the followings:
1) Energy consumption: Since a block is created for each
transaction and it is replicated to each node in the
network after adopting security features like hashing e.g.
MD5, SHA-256, SHA-512 etc..
2) Computation Power: In order to create a block, append-
ing a block, receive or send a block and incorporating
security features adds up to the complexity of the com-
putation power
3) Storage Memory: Since the block created or received
from other nodes are all stored, each node has a high
demand of memory for storing the data
4) Validation and verification: User and transaction vali-
dation can be an additional overhead, but its compulsory
for digital-based financial transactions. Who will be
responsible for sensor networks?
5) Control Overhead: Creating a new block leads to broad-
casting to a P2P network communication for necessary
block updates, however in a sensor network with limited
resources, it will be a challenging task.
6) Bandwidth: Creating of any new blocks by any node
leads to additional communication overhead and since
bandwidth is shared and is limited, efficient routing and
block updates techniques have to be designed not to stain
the limited bandwidth while dealing with overheads
7) Dynamic Nature of the Network: The network keeps
changing depending on the number of nodes (joining
or leaving or dying), change in cluster head, change in
route etc.
8) Identity Privacy: Even though anonymity is maintained,
its actual pseudonymity and others can figure out the
activity if the activity is not encrypted
9) Overheads for Data Secrecy: Applying high-end en-
cryption for data communication will further stress the
limited sensors and its network resources, however its
important if collected data is to be kept hidden from
the intruders. So, designing smart lightweight secure
encryption techniques are vital to support data secrecy.
Incorporating all the Blockchain features in a sensor net-
work may not be realistic due to limited battery life, compu-
tation power and storage unless an efficient framework and
techniques are adopted. The challenges and issues faced by
the Internet of Things network are also addressed in [25].
The time complexity of MD5 and SHA-256 is 	(N) and in
terms of computation time, MD5 takes lesser time compared
to the SHA-256 [26]. The output of the MD5 is 32 digit Hex
irrespective of the input file size and likewise for SHA-256, the
output is 64 digit Hex. So, in terms of storage, applying SHA-
256 will increase the storage by 100% and if SHA-512 is used
then storage will be increased by 400% compared to MD5. As
per the findings of the authors of [26], it can be deduced that
it takes an average of 1.85e-07 seconds and 5.07e-07 seconds
per byte size input data execution in MD5 and SHA-256
respectively when an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2430M CPU @
2,40GHz (4CPUs), 2.4 GHz architecture with 8.00 GB RAM
is used. It means that SHA-256 takes approximately 2.7 times
the time needed to execute the same input data compared to
MD5. In reality, the sensor nodes are not equipped with a
powerful processor and are supported by limited battery life
too but have to execute complex computation intensive hashing
and encryption if Blockchain security is to be incorporated. So,
it will be very unrealistic to apply Blockchain at the sensor
node level because it is not equipped with sufficient resources
especially in terms of computation power, storage, and battery
life. However, if Blockchain is applied then the advantages is
immense as highlighted earlier.
III. PROPOSED HIERARCHICAL SENSOR NETWORK
MODEL
In this paper, a novel approach of selecting and assigning
tasks for the cluster heads (Ch) depending on the type of
activity or its role (routing to the sink or collecting data
from sensors), sensor node density and rate of energy usage
is proposed. In this model, the nodes are classified into
two categories namely: potential cluster heads i.e. Sm (more
powerful in terms of computation and battery life) and normal
sensor nodes i.e. Sn which senses data and deliver data to the
Sink via the potential cluster heads or cluster heads. Therefore,
So, in this proposed model, any sensor nodes cannot become
a cluster head, rather a cluster head is selected only from Sp
which has more energy and computation power. In real life
applications, it becomes unrealistic to make the cluster heads
conduct routing, heavy computation and data forwarding all
at the same time for all the cluster members and be treated
as normal sensor nodes of the same energy and computational
level. Applying a power hungry and computational intensive
Blockchain (BC) technology to all the participating nodes of
the sensor networks to maintain data integrity and privacy
will not be realistic, because sensor nodes conduct only light
information gathering, processing, and communication. In a
normal sensor network without considering security features,
the main energy usage by a normal sensor node is due to
communication and computation.
In a normal sensor network scenario when a collected data is
relayed to the neighbor node or cluster head without much data
processing then data communication power may require more
energy than computation power [27]. However, if security
features like data integrity, confidentiality and availability are
incorporated then heavy processing of data will lead to a
very high computational power and energy consumption in
computation will outweigh the energy used in communication.
So, resource-aware load sharing is vital to distribute the energy
consumption levels of the participating active sensor nodes
(SNa), especially the designated cluster heads (Ch). Thus, the
sensor nodes are divided into more powerful (Sm) and normal
nodes (Sn), total sensor nodes deployed = Sm ∪ Sn. Among
the more powerful sensor nodes i.e. Sm, cluster heads Chs are
selected, so Sm = Ch ∪ Cp, where Cp are the sensor nodes
which can become cluster heads but are not acting as a cluster
head at the moment. The sensor nodes could be in an active or
passive mode or non-existent due to no battery life, so sensor
nodes (Sn) which could become cluster members = SNa ∪
SNn, where SNn are the non-active sensor nodes.
The paper address the following three aspects to make the
cluster heads more durable and secure.
• Dynamic cluster head selection.
• Resource aware routing to balance energy usage in the
network
• Using Blockchain to provide data privacy and security
Using Blockchain is not only computationally intensive
but also memory and communication intensive, so applying
Blockchain in a sensor network is not only challenging
but also very difficult, unless ways of reducing control and
communication overheads are designed, find ways to reduce
memory utilization and most importantly find ways to reduce
computation power.
A. Cluster Head Selection
In this model, cluster heads are dynamically and distribut-
edly selected. The factors used in selecting the cluster heads
are based on active node density (SNa), energy depletion
factor (Edf ) and a random value (Rv). All the deployed sensor
nodes need not be active at all times, because identical sensors
can share the activity load and some may go into suspend or
sleep mode while others are active. So, considering only the
number of active nodes at a given time is more appropriate
in evaluating the node density because it is the active nodes
Fig. 1. Routing from a Cluster Head to the Sink.
which involved during channel contention. In terms of energy
usage or residual energy, it is more appropriate to assign the
role of cluster head role to the one which uses lower rate of
energy or have a higher energy residual based on its recent
usage rather then simply looking into the static remaining
energy level, because the one using the higher energy rate
will end up depleting its energy level faster compared to
the one using energy with lower rate in the recent past, in
this work, the energy-depleting factor (Edf ) is derived from
Remaininge/EUrate where Remaininge and EUrate stands
for total remaining energy of the node and the rate of using the
energy in the recent past respectively. The active node density
distribution of the cluster members provides the level of load
distribution on the cluster head over time. Thus, a factor that
narrates the energy level of the present and the prospect of the
durability of the node’s energy is given by Euseful in 1.
Euseful =
Remaininge
EUrate × SNa (1)
When active node density and energy usage are similar
then the deciding factor for cluster head selection is governed
by a random value generated by each potential cluster heads
Cp. Initially, the energy levels will be the same or similar,
so the deciding factor for selecting cluster heads is active
node density (SNa) and a random value (Rv). If the derived
Euseful is similar then the random value will decide the
outcome of cluster head selection. In order to collect the
information about the potential cluster members, all the Sm
nodes broadcast a ”hello” packet to measure the density of
the cluster members that it can cover within a transmission
range and upon receiving the ”reply” messages from all the
active neighbor sensor nodes i.e. SNa, each potential cluster
head registers the number of all the active sensors. After
collecting the sensor density information of potential cluster
members within the vicinity of each potential cluster heads,
each potential cluster head Sm nodes conducts the following
steps:
1) Broadcast the Euseful and the pseudo-random value Rv
i.e. (Euseful and Rv)
2) Upon receiving (Euseful and Rv) by each Sm nodes,
it checks the possibility of becoming a cluster head by
checking the following:
a) It checks if Euseful of self is > Euseful of the rest
of Sm which are received and are well within its
transmission range. Then, this node becomes the
cluster head.
b) However, if its Euseful value is same with any of
the other potential cluster heads then, the value of
the pseudo-random value is check to see if its Rv
value is > Rv of the rest of the values generated
by the rest of Sm which are received and are well
within its transmission range. It is highly unlikely
that two or more potential cluster head generates
the same pseudo-random value at the same time.
3) If 2(a) or 2(b) is satisfied when a cluster head among
the competing nodes will be determined, however, if
Euseful and Rv are same (which is very highly un-
likely), then the nodes which have the same Rv are
allowed to regenerate a pseudo-random and re-broadcast
to determine who has a greater Rv to avoid conflicts.
4) Repeat step 3, if cluster head within a transmission range
cannot be determined.
5) Thus, cluster heads (Ch) is selected from among Sm.
The cluster head selection is initiated by the existing
cluster head based on the amount of energy spent (use
of 10% energy since it took charged of the cluster head
role) rather than time duration, because battery depletion
rate is directly related to the activity of the number of
sensor nodes and the rate of data generated. Considering
time duration to trigger cluster head selection process
could mean overwork for some cluster head while other
cluster head may be less busy depending on the activity
and the time of activation of the sensor nodes.
B. Routing from Source to Sink
Cluster heads are already overloaded by the incoming data
from the cluster members, so using the cluster heads to route
data from the sensor sources to the sink will enhance the
depletion of the battery life of the cluster heads. So, in this
framework, routing to the sink is conducted via the cluster
head from the sensor nodes as shown in figure 1. However,
the routing is designed in such a way that the path between
the sensor source node and the Sink is not built by the cluster
heads, rather the ith cluster head i.e. Chi build a path using the
other potential cluster heads Cp, rather than using the cluster
heads to balance the load, computing power, and energy usage.
The routing from a Source node to the Sink is done in two
stages in order to offload the burden of computation to the
sensor nodes as follows:
1) Source to the Cluster head: The routing from a Source
sensor node to its cluster head is conducted by a secure
broadcast technique to the Cluster head. The job of the Cluster
head is to collect information from the cluster members, but
in order to collect the information from the cluster members
securely, it provides its public key during the cluster member
discovery session, so that any information sent by the cluster
members are encrypted and are secure.
2) Cluster head to the Sink: The Cluster head is responsible
of discovering a route to the Sink for every Cluster members.
Adopting this method helps all the cluster members, because
each cluster members are now not responsible for discovering
a route to the Sink, rather only one node i.e. the Cluster head
is responsible for the route discovery for all its member only
once. So, the route discovery overhead is reduced immensely
as the number of cluster member increases. A novel flow based
load balancing AODV routing from a Cluster head to the Sink
is designed as follows:
1) All nodes do not forward route request routing packets.
So, the routing route request packets does not flood the
network.
2) Only the potential cluster heads Cp forwards the route
request initiated by the ith cluster head.
3) All the cluster members of the ith cluster head forwards
their data to the cluster head and the cluster head route
the data to the sink following the route via the potential
cluster heads Cp.
4) Each potential cluster heads Cp records the number of
flows generating from n unique sources. In order to
balance the load, power computation and energy usage,
potential cluster heads Cp forward the route request
packet along with the number of flows (Fn) it relays.
When an jth potential cluster head receives a route
request from an ith potential cluster head, it checks to
update the (Fn) to number of flows along that route as
follows:
a) If Fn of jth potential Cp > ith potential Cp then
Fn = flows of jth potential Cp.
b) Otherwise, Fn = flows of ith potential Cp. So, the
number of maximum number of flows along that
route is reported to the Sink.
5) The Sink node checks the following before the route
reply is initiated:
a) It compares the Fn values receives from all the
Cp
1, Cp2, Cp3, ...., Cpi, ..., Cpn through route
request packets.
b) Min of { Fn values} from among all the Cp is
selected and route reply is initiated.
By adopting this routing method three factors pertaining to
the load, computing power and energy usage of the cluster
heads will be reduced and durability of both the cluster heads
and potential cluster heads are distributed and balanced. This
provides a better scope to incorporate a memory, power, and
computation hungry technology like Blockchain technologies.
However, it will be very challenging to incorporate an in-
corruptible but transparently distributed ledger to ensure data
temper-proof, non-repudiation and resilient to failure etc.
Fig. 2. Cluster Heads updating its BC’s ID and its Public Key to the Sink.
Fig. 3. Communication using Public Key in the Blockchain.
Network Parameters Protocol/Value Used
Grid Size 1000 m2 x 1000 m2
Routing Protocol EEM-LEACH Vs Proposed LBMH
Queue Type DropTail
Queue Size 100
Bandwidth 2Mbps
Default Power (Pt) 24.49dBm
Default RXThresh -64.37dBm
Default CSThresh -78.07dBm
MaxRetry 7
Simulation Time 1000
Traffic Type CBR
Frame size 100 Bytes
TABLE I
SENSOR NETWORK SIMULATION SETUP.
IV. PROPOSED PRIVATE BLOCKCHAIN IN LBMH- SENSOR
NETWORK ROUTING
Cryptographic complexity of Blockchain limits its applica-
bility in Sensor Networks due to the limited resources available
in the sensor nodes. However, to harvest the benefits of
Blockchain, an attempt is made to design a private Blockchain
in order to avoid data tampering, damage or falsification of
information and to prevent from potential threats, attacks, and
misuse of information. In this framework, miners will not be
involved, but the Sink will be responsible for authenticating
the participating sensors nodes and the Sink stores the node’s
ID along with the anonymized BC node IDs. It also stores all
the public keys of all the participating sensor nodes, so that
it becomes easier for the Chs to retrieve the public keys i.e.
Pks. During the route discovery from the source’s Ch to the
Sink node, the Sink stores the reverse route information to the
source. So, the Sink doesn’t need to re-discover the route to
the Ch again as long as the routes are valid. This measure
will offload the control overhead of performing heavy peer-
to-peer communication when block updates have to take place
because, in this framework, block updates will take place via
the Sink otherwise the overheads of conducting block update
will overload the limited sensor network resources. All the
cluster head updates its BC’s ID and Pk to the Sink as shown
in figure 2. Since the Sink node has high computation power,
high bandwidth, high energy, and high memory storage, it is
used to facilitate, store and relay public keys of the cluster
heads in the proposed Blockchain model as shown in figure 3.
Each block stores nonce (8 bytes), previous header’s hash (32
bytes), timestamp (8 bytes), block type (1 byte), data count of
each type (8 bytes), and the hash of the data (32 bytes), in this
model the actual data is not stored in the blocks, otherwise the
volume of data generated will be impossible to store especially
when the data is audio, video or picture etc. So, other sensor
nodes or cluster nodes cannot know the actual data collected
by other sensors but is used only to maintain consistency. All
the data collected from the sensor nodes is communicated to
the Sink (Gateway) by encrypting using the Sink’s public key,
so only the Sink can decrypt the information. In terms of
securing data communication between P2P, an RSA public
key cryptography is used in the framework and for hashing
SHA-256 is used.
In the following sections will analyze the energy, stor-
age and control overhead usage for the proposed private
Blockchain and also study if the proposed routing and cluster
head selection enhance the durability and connectivity of
the network. The proposed private Blockchain based load
balancing multi-hop routing is compared with EEM-LEACH
[28] which discovers a multi-hop path considering minimum
communication cost from each sensor nodes to the Sink.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this study, the focus is given on battery utilization
and storage requirement when a Blockchain using SHA-256
hashing and an RSA public key cryptography is adopted. It
is clear that adopting Blockchain will not only protect the
Fig. 4. Energy usage during data Transmission in EEM-LEACH Routing.
Fig. 5. Energy usage during Data Transmission and Blockchain update in
Proposed LBMH-Routing.
sensed data by the sensors but the Sink (the Gateway) is
also protected from the man-in-middle attack because the
neighboring cluster heads will help the Sink in ensuring data
consistency through Blockchain hashing, secrecy, and privacy
through RSA algorithm. The network parameters used in the
test are given in table I. In this simulation model, it is assumed
that 100 mJ/s of energy is used during encryption, decryption
and hashing computation by the Sink, Cluster Head, and the
Potential Cluster Heads.
A. Battery Life
In EEM-LEACH Routing as shown in 4, the energy usage of
the Gateway/Sink, Cluster Heads, Potential Cluster Heads, and
the sensor nodes decreases as the data rates of the participating
nodes increases because more data could be transmitted for a
fix data packet size per second. However, the energy utilization
of the active nodes remains constant after 88kb/s because 100
Byte packet gets saturated after that data rate. It is observed
that in the EEM-LEACH routing protocol, the amount of
energy used by the Cluster Heads and the Sensor nodes are
similar, however, the potential surrounding cluster heads use
lesser energy, so the energy depletion rate of the cluster head
is high in this model. When the data rate is low and more time
is required to send a 100 Byte packet, each node uses close
to 1000 mJ/s except the neighbor nodes, however, the energy
usage goes down as low as around 600 mJ/s for both Cluster
Heads and the Sensor nodes. When the neighbor nodes do
not participate in the transaction of sending or receiving data,
it also uses energy for sensing and checking node status and
surrounding activity.
On the other hand in the proposed routing model using a
private Blockchain Technology, the amount of energy usage
with the cluster head and the potential cluster heads are similar,
because of the fact that the routing of multi-hop nodes are not
conducted via the Cluster heads unlike EEM-LEACH, but they
are routed via the potential cluster heads. It is an advantage in
terms of energy sharing and balancing to prolonged the battery
life of the participating nodes. Another advantage is that
the usage of the sensor node’s energy is reduced immensely
compared to the cluster heads and the potential cluster heads
because it is the cluster heads that endures and carried out all
the complex computations including encryption, decryption,
and routing etc. However, the amount of energy used is
extremely high compared to the ones like EEM-LEACH which
does not use Blockchain Technology. The amount of energy
usage is as high as nearly 2400 mJ/s when the data rate is
as low as 8 kb/s and it’s as low as around 700 mJ/s for
sensor nodes while the cluster heads and potential cluster
heads consumed energy as low as approximately 1500 mJ/s.
It shows that the amount of energy consumption is around
150% more for the Gateway/Sink, cluster heads and potential
cluster heads when Blockchain technology is adopted. It also
shows that Block updates in a Blockchain consume as much
energy as the energy used in normal data transmission. This
energy consumption is calculated when the sensor network is
activated using only two active sensor nodes generating 100
Bytes packet at a constant rate. It means that as the number of
active sensor nodes increases, the amount of energy usage for
Block updates, and other cryptographic computation is going
to increase exponentially. More active nodes imply more Block
updates, and it means higher bandwidth requirement, and it
also means that the overall performance of the network will
degrade due to limited bandwidth. So, in terms of battery
life support, applying Blockchain will cripple the limited
constrained bandwidth and the limited power supply.
B. Storage Requirement
In terms of storage requirement, since the normal sensor
nodes or the cluster heads don’t store data except buffering
during queuing not much storage space is required in any
normal sensor nodes. In this study, the size of the queue is
100, so at the most 100 packets can be queued at a time,
however, when Blockchain is adopted, it is mandatory to
have permanent storage for maintaining the Blocks of the
Blockchain. In this model, the size of each Block is 89 Bytes,
so irrespective of the data size generated or sent by the sensors,
the Block size is 89 Bytes. In this test, a packet size of 100
Bytes is taken into account, and the simulation was run for
1000 seconds. When the data rate was 120 kb/s, the throughput
was 107 packets per second per sensor node, which accounts
to 107 Blocks per second, and equates to 107000 for 1000
seconds. So, the storage required equals to 89 Bytes x 107000
= 9.523 Megabyte. When there are 100 sensors and the number
of data generated is the same, then 952.3 Megabyte data is
formed as a Blockchain when 100 sensors gather data for just
1000 seconds (16.6667 minutes). It means that in an average
when 100 sensor nodes are active and each sensor generates
107 packets per second and each packet size is 100 Bytes,
then 952.3 Megabyte of Blockchain data is generated within
approximately 17 minutes. It will make Blockchain unsustain-
able for any form of wireless sensor networks, despite load
balancing and energy distribution because of storage hungry.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
In resource-constrained sensor networks, incorporating a re-
source hungry technology like Blockchain is a huge challenge.
In order to make it a reality, multiple considerations has to be
taken into account to meet the resource requirement in terms of
computation power, communication overhead, battery life, and
limited bandwidth etc. In this framework, the Sink is updated
with the routes of the cluster heads to reduce control overheads
during block update activities. Routing via the potential cluster
heads for routing rather than using the cluster heads balances
and distribute the energy usage. During a new block formation
and block updates, cluster head does it via the Sink securely
and when a new cluster head is selected, the Blockchain is
updated from its neighbor cluster head.
It is realized that introducing Blockchain in a sensor net-
works is far from reality especially for real time data like
voice or video, because storage and battery life will not be
able to support with ease even if computation and bandwidth
constraint are ignored. In future, detail network performance
will be further studied with different data types and the
framework will be tested using real devices.
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